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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
There  is now  a large  literature  documenting  the 
statistical  relation  between  stock  prices  and  dividends 
at the  aggregate  level.  A robust  finding  is that  stock 
prices  are too  volatile  to be  explained  by  subsequent 
changes  in dividends.  Observations  of large  market 
swings,  like the  crash  of October  1987  and the  mini- 
crash  of  October  1989,  encourage  the  popular 
perception  that  stock  prices  are  excessively  volatile. 
While  these  observations  have  provoked  a great  deal 
of  analysis,  there  has  been  little  discussion  of  the 
possible  link between  excess  stock  price  volatility  and 
the  fact  that  changes  in the  control  of large  corpora- 
tions  often  take  place  via  market  acquisition  of  the 
outstanding  shares.  These  transactions- 
takeovers-are  often  associated  with  dramatic  in- 
creases  in  the  price  of  the  shares  of  the  firm  being 
acquired;  these  are called  “takeover  premia.”  In fact, 
some  commentators  argue  that  movements  in  the 
stock  market  in the  198Os, including  the  large market 
declines  of  October  1987  and  October  1989,  were 
linked  to  changes  in takeover  activity.  In this  article 
we  explore  the  possible  link  between  takeover  ac- 
tivity  and  stock  price  volatility. 
The  explanation  we  propose  relies  on  recent  ad- 
vances  in our  understanding  of imperfections  in the 
monitoring  of  firm  managers.  These  imperfections 
imply  that  there  is a “value  of control”  (we make  this 
term  more  precise  below)  that  is appropriable  by the 
managers  of  a large  corporation.  This  private  value 
of  control  arises  out  of  the  delegation  of  decision- 
making  authority  that  is intrinsic  to  the  separation 
of ownership  and  control  in the  modern  corporation. 
The  value  of control  explains,  in part,  the  premium 
often  paid to shareholders  to acquire  control  of a firm. 
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We  will  argue  that  the  value  of  control,  along  with 
the  probability  that  someone  will  be  willing  to  pay 
it,  can  vary  independently  of  the  expected  present 
value  of dividends.  This  adds  an independent  source 
of  variation  to  the  price  of  the  traded  shares  of 
publicly  held  corporations. 
The  plan  of  the  paper  is  to  first  describe  the 
Martingale  Model  of  stock  prices,  often  referred  to 
as  the  “efficient  markets  theory.”  This  serves  as  a 
benchmark,  both  for the  excess  volatility  findings  and 
for the  alternative  model  we propose.  We  then  survey 
some  of  the  key  empirical  regularities  concerning 
stock  prices:  these  include  the  excess  volatility 
finding  in  time  series  of  aggregate  stock  prices,  as 
well  as the  behavior  of individual  stock  prices  before 
and  after  control  change  transactions. 
We  then  proceed  to outline  the  essential  elements 
of our model  of the  link between  takeovers  and  stock 
prices.  First,  we  describe  imperfections  in the  rela- 
tionship  between  a large firm’s managers  and the  peo- 
ple  who  hold  claims  issued  by  the  firm.  Next,  we 
describe  the  implications  of these  imperfections  for 
some  of  the  characteristics  of  the  claims  issued  by 
the  firm-specifically,  the  legal  control  mechanism 
associated  with  them.  We  argue  that  traded  shares 
are bundled  claims  giving the  holder  the  right  to help 
determine  the  control  of the  firm  as well  as a claim 
on  a stream  of  dividends.  We  then  show  how  such 
shares  can  display  excess  volatility  because  of vari- 
ations  in the  expected  future  value  of the  control  right 
embedded  in the  claim.  The  final  section  describes 
some  of the  implications  of these  insights  for  policy 
and  for  economic  theory.  The  appendix  provides  a 





As  a  benchmark,  consider  a  simple  but  general 
model  of  the  determination  of  stock  prices,  the 
Martingale  Model.  The  empirical  findings  of excess 
volatility  that  we  describe  below  are  essentially 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  29 contradictions  between  the  properties  of the  Martin- 
gale  Model  and  those  of actual  stock  market  data; 
stock  prices  are  more  volatile  relative  to  dividends 
than  is predicted  by  the  Martingale  Model.  When 
we describe  an alternative  explanation  for stock  price 
volatility,  a comparison  of the predictions  of the  alter- 
native  model  with those  of the  Martingale  Model  will 
be  useful. 
According  to  the  Martingale  Model-often  re- 
ferred  to  as  the  “efficient,  markets  theory”  or  the 
“expected  present  value relation”-the  price of a given 
stock  at  any  given  time  is  equal  to  the  expected 
present  value  of the  stream  of future  dividends  that 
will accrue  on  that  stock’.  To  be  more  explicit,  let 
pt  be  the  price  of  a  share  of  stock  at  time  t  (after 
payment  of dividends  .due at time  t);  let dt.+ s be  the 
amount  paid  in dividends  paid  at  time  t +s,  where 
the  index  s  takes  on  the  values  1,2,3,  .  .  .  .  We 
abstract  fromlinflation,  and  so we  assume  ihat  dt + s 
is the  real ‘value  of dividends  at  time  t $ s.  We  also 
abstract  frsm  stock  splits  or repurchases,  and  so the 
sequence  of  dividends,’  dt +.s  for  s ;  1,2,3  .  .  ., 
captures  the  total return  to an investor  who purchases 
the  share  at time  ; and  holds  it to eternity.  Note  that 
from  the  point  of view  of an  investor  at the  current 
date,  the  future  stream  of  dividends  is  a  sequence 
of  random  variibles: 
The  Martingale  Model  asserts  that  there  is a con; 
stant  rate  r,  where  r :>  0,  at which  future  elipected 
returns  are discounted  back  to the  present,‘and  that 
the  current  price  is related  to next  period’s  price  and 
next  period’s  dividend  by  the  ‘equation‘ 
(1)  pt  =  (1  +  r)-‘EMpt+l  +  c&+11, 
where  Et[wt +‘J  is  notation  for .the  expected  value 
of  a  random  variable  wt+s,  with  the  expectation 
taken  using  only  information  available’ at  period  t. 
Equation  (1)  states, that  the  current  price  of a Stock 
equals  the  expected  value  of the  sum sf next  pe6o$s 
price  and  dividends,  discounted  back  to the  present 
at  rate  r.z 
Equation  (1)  can  be  used  to  derive  an  equation 
relating  the  current  stock  price  to the  entire  stream 
I Stephen  F.  Leroy  (1989)  calls  this  theory  the  Martingale 
Model.  His  article also contains  an excellent  deskriotion.  historv. 
1  ,  ~,I 
and  survey  of empirical  tests  of the  theory’. This  section  follows 
his  exposition. 
* A  martingale  is  any  randoni  series  {wt}  that  always  satisfies 
wt  =  &[wt+  I].  The  model  is  called  the  Martingale  Model 
because  there  is  a  simple  variable  that  is  a, martingale-the 
present  value  of  the  value  of  a  mutual  fund  that  reinvests  all 
dividend  earnings.  See  Leroy  (1989,  pp.  1589-90). 
of ,future  dividends.  First,  update  equation  (1)  one 
period,  replacing  t + 1 by  t +2  and  t  by  t + 1,  and 
substitute  the  resulting  expression  in (1) for pt + I to 
get 
(2)  pt  =  (1  +  r)-‘Et[(l  +  r)-‘Et+I[pt+z 
+  dt+21  +  c&+11, 
where  Et + l[wt + 21  ‘is  the  expected  value  of  the 
random  variable  wt + 2 given  information  available  at 
time  t + i.  The  law of iterated  expectations  implies 
that  IMEt + dpt +  211  =  E&t +  21.  ‘Equation (2) can 
then  be  rewritten  as 
(3)  pt  =  (1  +  r)-lEt[d;+ll  +  (1  +‘ds2Et[pt+2 
+  &+21. 
If one  repeats  this  substitution  n  times,  the  result 
is an equation  relating  pt to  the  stream  of dividends 
from  period  t + 1 to period  t + n,  plus  the  term  (1  + 
r) - nEt[pt + ,I.  One  can  assume  that  this  term  con- 
verges  to, zero  as n approaches  infinity.  This  assump- 
tion  rules  out  speculative  bubbles.  (We’ll discuss  this 
assumption  below.)  Under  this assumption,  the  equa- 
tion  obtained  as the,limit  of this  repeated  substitu- 
tion  is 
(4).  Pt  =  d, 
where  v,”  =  5  (1  +  r)-.SEtIdt+sl. 
‘s= 1 
Equation  (4)  states  that  the  current  price  .of a stock 
equals  v:‘,  the  present  value  of  expected  future 
dividends. 
Thismodel  was first advanced  by Paul,Sainuelson 
(1965),  and  is  often  .called  the’  “efficient  capital 
mark&s  inodel,”  a  teim  associated  with  Eugene 
Fama’s’  (1970)  exposition.  The  model  can  be 
vietied  as  arising  in  particular’  classes  of  artificial 
ecoiomies;  An  artificial’economy  is just  a particular 
mathematical  specification  of  the’  preferences, 
technological  opportunities,  and informational  abilities 
of ‘economic  agents,  together  ‘with  sonii= notion  -of 
the  mutual  consistency  of plans,  or  equilibrium.  In 
one  class  of artificial economies  that  gives  rise to the 
Martingale  Model;  agents  are  risk-neutral,  discount 
the  future  at  the  same  rate,  and  share  common 
information  and  beliefs  about  future  returns  (see 
Lucas  (1978)).  In  another  such.  class  there  is  a 
p&rf&tly  risk-free  asset,  and  all randomness  in stock 
returns  is  idiosyncratic  to  individual  stocks  (see 
Connor  (1984)). 
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does  not  always  hold.  However,  there  is usually  a 
more  general  version  of equation  (1) that  does  hold. 
In  general,  the  current  stock  price  is related  to  the 
entire  probability  distribution  governing  the  sum  of 
next  period’s  price  and  dividends,  rather  than  just 
the  mean,  as  in  (1).  This  implies  that  risk  premia 
can  affect  the  current  price  of  a  stock,  as  in  the 
Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  or  the  Arbitrage  Pric- 
ing  Theory  (see  Connor  (1984)).  More  general 
economies  also  imply  that  discount  rates  can  vary 
over  time,  rather  than  remain  constant  as in  (1).  It 
turns  out,  however,  that  empirical  contradictions  of 
(1) or (4) do not seem  to be attributable  to risk premia 
or  time-varying  risk  premia  (see  West  (1988b)). 
Even  in  economies  in which  equation  (1)  holds, 
the  stock  price  may  not  satisfy  equation  (4) because 
of the  presence  of a speculative  bubble.  A stock  price 
is  said  to  contain  a bubble  if it  can  be  written  as 
(5)  p!  =  pt  +  bt, 
where  pt is given  by e 
B 
uation  (4),  and  bt is the  bub- 
ble term.  In order  for pt to satisfy  (l),  it must  be true 
that  bt  =  (1  +  r) - ‘Et[bt + r].  In  fact,  any  random 
bt  series  that  satisfies  this  condition  implies  that  p! 
satisfies  (1).  There  are  an  infinite  number  of  bt 
random  variable  series  that  satisfy  this  condition,  so 
there  are  an  infinite  number  of  solutions,  p:,  that 
satisfy  equation  (1).  Only  one  solution  is consistent 
with  (4),  however,  and  that  is the  solution  in which 
bt  =  0.  Recall  that  in  deriving  equation  (4)  we 
assumed  that  the  expression  (1  +  r) - “Et[pt + ,] 
converges  to zero  as n grows  very  large.  This  effec- 
tively  rules  out  any  solution  other  than  p!  =  pt.3 
A negative  value  for bt implies  that  there  is a positive 
probability  that  the  stock  price  is eventually  negative, 
which  is inconsistent  with the  free disposal  of stocks. 
This  case is conventionally  ruled  out.  A positive  value 
for  bt  implies  that  the  stock  price  is  always  above 
the  fundamental  value,  given  by  equation  (4).  It  is 
useful  to keep  in mind  the  properties  of bubble  solu- 
tions  to equation  (1) because  our model  of takeovers 
and  stock  prices  predicts  that  an  econometrician 
would  be  unable  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that  stock 
prices  contain  a  bubble  term. 
3  To  see  this,  note  that: 
(1  +  19-~Etlpi’+.l  =  (1  +  r)-"EtIbt+n  + pt+nl 
= bt  + (1  +  r)-nEtfpt+.l, 
which  converges  to  bt  if pt +n  is  the  series  defined  by  (4). 
III. 
SOME EMPIRICAL  REGULARITIES 
IN  STOCK  PRICES 
Aggregate  Stock  Prices 
The  Martingale  Model  has  some  strong  implica- 
tions  for  the  joint  behavior  of  stock  prices  and 
dividends.  One  of the  most  striking  of these  is  an 
upper  bound  on the variability  of stock  prices  relative 
to  dividends.  There  is now  a large  literature,  begin- 
ning  with  the  seminal  papers  by  Leroy  and  Porter 
(1981)  and  by  Shiller  (1981),  that  documents  the 
failure of empirical  data on stock  prices  and dividends 
to satisfy this inequality;  see West  (1988b)  and Leroy 
(1989)  for  recent  surveys. 
To  understand  this  variance  bound,  first  define  a 
variable  et + s as the difference  between  the  actual and 
expected  dividends  in period  t +s.  In  other  words, 
(6)  et+s  = dt+,  -  Et[dt+,],  for  s=1,2,3,.  . . : 
Then  define  a variable  d;as  the present  discounted 
value, of acmal dividends.  Shiller  called  this  the  “ex 
post  rational”  stock  price.  This  is what  the  price  of 
the  stock  would  be  if  the  entire  stream  of  future 
dividends  were  known  with perfect  certainty,  and the 
Martingale  Model,  equation  (4),  determined  the 
price.  More  explicitly, 
(7)  d;  =sFl(l  +  r)-Sdt+s. 
Using  these  two  definitions,  we  can  obtain  the  fol- 
lowing  relation  between  pt  and  dt? 
(8)  d; = pt + xt, 
where  x:’  =  El(l  +  d-Set+s. 
Equation  (8)  states  that  the  ex  post  rational  price  is 
equal to the  actual current  price plus the present  value 
of the  unexpected  component  of future  dividends. 
One  immediate  implication  is that  the current  price 
is an unbiased  forecast  of the  ex post  rational  price; 
in other  words,  pt  =  Et[dt’].  This  follows  from  the 
fact  that  Et[et + ,]  =  0 because  of the  optimality  of 
forecasts  of  future  dividends.  The  optimality  of 
forecasts  also  implies  that  the  forecast  errors,  et + s, 
s=l,Z,  .  .  .  ,  are  uncorrelated  with  pt,  and  this 
implies  that  pt  and  x? are  uncorrelated.  Therefore, 
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variances  of pt  and  d;: 
(9)  var(d;)  =  var(pt)  +  var(xtd). 
Since  variances  are positive,  equation  (9) implies  that 
the  variance  of  stock  prices  has  an  upper  bound: 
(10)  var(d;  )  1  var(pt). 
The  variance  of  the  actual  stock  price  can  be  no 
greater  than  the  variance  of the  present  value  of ac- 
tual  future  dividends. 
The  original  tests  of the  inequality  (10)  were  first 
published  in  1981  by  Leroy  and  Porter,  and  by 
Shiller; both  papers  reported  violations  that were  large 
in  magnitude  and  statistically  significant.  A  large 
number  of papers  have  appeared  since  developing 
or applying  this inequality  test  (see  the  recent  survey 
by West  (1988b)).  S ome  initial work  questioned  the 
finding  of excess  volatility  on econometric  grounds, 
arguing  that  small  sample  bias  and/or  the  presence 
of unit  roots  in dividends  may explain  the  results  (see 
Flavin  (1983),  Marsh  and  Merton  (1986),  and 
Kleidon  (1986)).  Subsequent  studies  taking  account 
of the  possibility  of unit  roots  and  small  sample  bias 
“still tend  to find substantial  excess  volatility”  (West 
(1988b),  p.  639). 
Recent  work  has  examined  the  possibility  that 
risk  aversion  causes  stock  prices  to deviate  from  the 
Martingale  Model,  as might  be  expected  from  more 
general  theories  of  asset  pricing  (see  Singleton 
(1987)).  Allowing risk averse  investors,  however,  fails 
to  explain  excess  volatility.  Other  recent  work  has 
examined  the  possibility  that  the  expected  rate  of 
return,  r, varies  over  time  (see  Campbell  and  Shiller 
(1988a  and  1988b),  and  West  (1988a)).  Although 
this  line of work  is at a very  preliminary  stage,  initial 
results  suggest  that  the  variance  of the  expected  rate 
of return  would  have  to  be  implausibly  large  to  ex- 
plain  the  excess  volatility  results.  Consequently, 
many  of the  simplifications  inherent  in the Martingale 
Model  do not  seem  to be  responsible  for the  incon- 
sistency  between  the  model  and  the  data. 
Some  researchers  have  examined  whether  the 
finding  of  excess  volatility  could  be  caused  by 
speculative  bubbles.  It  appears  that  empirical 
evidence  on  stock  prices  is  consistent  with  the 
presence  of bubbles,  which  is not  surprising,  because 
bubbles  can  take  many  forms  (see  West  (1987  and 
1988a),  and  Shiller  (1984)).  Bubbles  are  often 
associated  (in many  people’s  minds)  with  large  sus- 
tained  increases  in asset  prices  followed  by  a sharp 
collapse,  as  in Tulipmania,  the  South  Sea  Bubble, 
and  other  famous  cases  (see  Mackay  (18X),  but  see 
also  Garber  (1989)). 
Bubbles  need  not  take  such  a  spectacular  form, 
however.  In the  model  of takeovers  and  stock  prices 
that  we consider  below,  an econometrician  examin- 
ing  data  generated  by  the  model  would  be  unable 
to reject  the  conclusion  that  the  stock  price  includes 
a  bubble.  But ‘in  our  model,  what’  appears  to  the 
econometrician  to be a bubble  term  is uniquely  deter- 
mined  and  has  an economic  rationale-it  is actually 
part  of the  fundamental  of  the  stock,  properly  de- 
fined. Therefore,  one way of interpreting  our explana- 
tion  of stock  price  volatility  is that  the  characteristics 
of  the. financial  claims  of  the  modern  corporation 
could  give rise to what  appears to be a bubble  in stock 
prices.  This  exemplifies  the  point  made  by Hamilton 
and  Whiteman  (1985)  and  Hamilton  (1986)  that 
movements  in  the  true  fundamental  that  are 
unobserved  by the-econometrician  are indistinguish- 
able  from  bubbles. 
Takeovers  and  Individual  Stock  Prices 
The  research  discussed  above  focuses  on  the 
behavior  of the  aggregate  stock  price  and  dividend 
series.  At  the  level  of the  individual  firm,  the  rela- 
tionship  between  the  market  for  corporate  control 
and  stock  prices  has  been  extensively  investigated 
using  the  “event  study”  methodology.  This  approach 
examines  the  behavior  of share  prices  of participating 
firms  around  the  date  of  the  announcement  of  a 
takeover  or other  change  in control.  To  the  extent 
that  stock  price  changes  cannot  be  explained  by  a 
market  model  (the  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model,  for 
example),  these  abnormal  changes  are  attributed  to 
the takeover  event.  Much  of the event  study  literature 
on  takeovers  was  surveyed  by  Jensen  and  Ruback 
(1983).4  Averaging  over  the  results  of  a  large 
number  of  studies,  Jensen  and  Ruback  find  that 
there  is a 30 percent  abnormal  increase  in the  stock 
price  of a target  firm  in the  event  of a tender  offer 
takeover  (a takeover  executed  by  a direct  purchase 
of  shares).  In  the  case  of  mergers,  when  there  is 
agreement  on  the  acquisition  between  the  manage- 
ments  of the  acquiring  and  target  firms,  the  gains  in 
the  target’s  stock  price  are  substantially  lower  (20 
percent).  One  might  conclude,  in these  cases,  that 
part  of the  premium  that  the  acquirer  is  willing  to 
4 Also see the recent  survey  by Jarrel,  Bri&ey  and Netter  (1988). 
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ment.  When  a change  in control  is executed  through 
a proxy  contest  with  little  or  no  direct  purchase  of 
shares  by those  acquiring  control,  the  abnormal  stock 
price  change  is much  smaller  (8 percent).  In the  cases 
of  tender  offers  and  mergers,  Jensen  and  Ruback 
report  that  the  abnormal  changes  in the  stock  prices 
of bidding  firms  are  much  smaller  than  those  for the 
target  firms;  there  is a 4 percent  change  for bidding 
firms  in  tender  offers  and  no  significant  change  in 
mergers. 
Jensen  and  Ruback  interpret  the  results  from  the 
event  study  .literature  as providing  evidence  that  the 
market  for  corporate  control  reallocates  productive 
resources  from  less to more  efficient  users  (manage- 
ments).  That  is,  takeovers  create  value  for  share- 
holders  because  they  result  in  an  improved  use  of 
resources.  One  might  call this the “inefficient manage- 
ment  hypothesis.”  This  hypothesis  suggests  a world 
in which  some  managements  are better  matched. than 
others  to the  assets  and  activities  of any  given  firm. 
Hence,  in this  view,  the  market  for  corporate  con- 
trol  is  a market  in  which  managers  search  for  and 
acquire  firms  to  which  they  are  well  matched. 
Like  the  inefficient  management  hypothesis, 
the  process  described  in  this  paper  is  also  one  of 
searching  and  matching.  In  our  view,  however,  a 
manager  can  earn  private  benefits  from  an  im- 
proved  match  between  management  and  assets.  If 
managers  are  motivated  by  this  private  value,  then 
one would  expect  to see  acquiring  managements  pay 
a premium  for control.  At the  same  time,  one  would 
not  necessarily  expect  acquisitions  to generate  value 
for shareholders  of the  acquiring  firm.  These  expec- 
tations  are supported  by the distribution  of stock price 
gains  observed  in  the  event  study  literature;  large 
gains accrue  to target  firm shareholders  in tender  offer 
takeovers  and  little  or  no  gains  accrue  to  acquiring 
firm  shareholders.  Similarly,  one  would  not  neces- 
sarily  expect  acquisitions  driven  by  the  value  of 
control  to  result  in  improved  profitability  after  the 
acquisition.  An  extensive  literature,  surveyed  by 
Mueller  (1987),  has  examined  post-merger  perfor- 
mance  using accounting  data. The  most  notable  result 
is the  failure  to find  evidence  of improved  perform- 
ance after mergers.  While this evidence  has been  used 
to  discredit  the  inefficient  management  hypothesis, 
it is consistent  with  the  approach  described  in this 
paper  based  on  the  private  value  of  control. 
Takeovers  and  Aggregate  Stock 
Price  Movements 
If one  accepts  the  existence  of a control  premium 
in a takeover  transaction,  there  are sharp  implications 
for  the  time  series  behavior  of  an  individual  firm’s 
stock  price;  the  price  would  fluctuate  not  only ,with 
information  about  future  dividends,  but  also  with 
information  about  the  probability  of a change  in con- 
trol  of the  firm.  The  existence  of a control  premium 
does  not,  by itself, have any implications  for aggregate 
stock  price  behavior.  If the  probability  of a takeover 
were  independent  across  firms  and  over  time,  then 
the  effect  on  stock  prices  would  average  out  across 
firms.  Stock  price  indices  would,  then,  be  expected 
to vary  only with  information  about  expected  future 
aggregate  dividends.  If, however,  there  are systematic 
movements  in aggregate  takeover  activity  over  time, 
then  takeover  activity  (or  expected  future  levels  of 
takeover  activity)  will affect  aggregate  stock  prices. 
There  is  evidence  suggesting  that  aggregate 
takeover  activity  is subject  to systematic  movements 
over  time.  Shughart  and  Tollison  (1984)  examine 
annual  data  on the  number  of takeovers  in the  U.S. 
from  1895  to  1979.  They  find  that  they  cannot 
reject  the  hypothesis  that  merger  activity  follows  a 
random  walk.  If this  is so,  then  an  unexpected  rise 
in  takeover  activity  has  persistent  effects.  Hence, 
future  expected  rates  of takeover  activity  will depend 
on  the  current  rate.  If  a  higher  aggregate  rate  of 
takeovers  implies  a higherprobability  that  a randomly 
selected  firm  will face  a challenge  for  control,  then 
the  random  walk  behavior  of  takeover  activity  has 
implications  for  the  behavior  of  aggregate  stock 
prices.  A  rise  in  takeover  activity  implies  a rise  in 
the  rate  at  which  control  premia  are  realized  in 
changes  of control.  This,  in turn,  implies  higher  stock 
prices  in  the  aggregate. 
The  notion  that  there  is a link  between  takeover 
activity  and  aggregate  stock  prices  is certainly  con- 
sistent  with  casual  observation  of  the  behavior  of 
stock  prices  in the  1980s.  The  decade  witnessed  an 
unprecedented  wave  of activity  in the  market  for cor- 
porate  control,  coinciding  with  a  sustained  and 
substantial  rise in stock  prices.  The  two large declines 
in the  market  in the  late  1980s  in October  1987  and 
October  1989,  both  came  at times  when  many  were 
beginning  to  suspect  that  the  takeover  and  buyout 
boom  might  be  coming  to  an  end.  In fact,  much  of 
the  discussion  surrounding  the  mini-crash  of October 
1989  centered  on  the  collapse  of a single  deal,  the 
UAL  buyout.  It  was  feared  that  the  failure  of  the 
pilots’  union  to  raise  the  financing  for  their  offer 
was  a  signal  of  similar  problems  arising  for  future 
deals.  Many  commentators  attributed  the  preceding 
increase  in overall stock  prices  from January  to August 
of 1989  in part  to expectations  of increased  takeover 
activity.  Most  notably,  some  recent  research  seems 
to  indicate  that  the  over  10 percent  decline  in the 
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arguably  triggered  the  crash  of  October  19,  1987, 
was  caused  by  U.S.  House  Ways  and  Means  Com- 
mittee  consideration  and  approval  of a tax  bill con- 
taining  restrictive  antitakeover  provisions  (Mitchell 
and  Netter  (1989)). 
Iv. 
ANALTERNATIVEEXPLANATIONOF 
STOCK  PRICE  VOLATILITY 
The  previous  section  summarized  the  empirical 
literature  on  the  volatility  of aggregate  stock  prices 
and  argued  that  volatility  is too  large  to  be  consis- 
tent  with  the  Martingale  Model  described  in  Sec- 
tion  II.  In this  section  we  present  a theory  of stock 
price  volatility that  is based  on takeovers.  The  theory 
is  also  consistent  with  the  empirical  regularities 
displayed  by  individual  stock  prices  around  control 
change  events.  In  addition,  the  theory  offers  an 
explanation  for  the  broad  comovements  in  stock 
prices  and  control  change  activity  described  above. 
The  key  to the  relationship  between  takeovers  and 
the  volatility  of stock  prices  is the  value  of control 
of a firm.  In  this  section  we  discuss  the  concept  of 
“the  value  of control,”  and  describe  how  the  value 
of  control  can  affect  stock  prices. 
The  Nature  of  the  Firm  and 
the  Value  of  Control 
To  make  precise  just  what  we  mean  by  the  term 
“value  of control,”  we  briefly  describe  some  impor- 
tant  features  of the  way  the  modern,  publicly  held 
corporation  is  organized. 
The  diverse  activities  associated  with  the  modern 
large  corporation  involve  a large  number  of people: 
employees,  directors,  and the  individuals  and institu- 
tions  holding  the  contractual  liabilities  of the  firm, 
to  name  just  a few.  We  focus  on  two  main  groups. 
We  refer  to  the  individual  or  group  of  individuals 
exercising  effective  control  over  the  firm’s operations 
as the  management  or managers:  the  chief executive 
officer,  for  example.  We  will refer  to  the  people  or 
institutions  that  own  the  explicit  financial  claims 
issued  by  the  firm  as  claimholders:  for  example, 
shareholders,  bondholders,  or banks  that  have  made 
loans  to  the  firm. 
The  relationship  between  managers  and  claim- 
holders  is a complex  one,  governed  by  a variety  of 
legal  (and  other)  arrangements.  For  example,  loan 
and  bond  contracts  often  contain  explicit  covenants 
that  restrict  future  actions  of  the  firm,  including 
investment  decisions,  financial  restructuring,  or ex- 
cessive  dividend  payouts  (see  Smith  and  Warner 
(1979)).  Publicly  held  firms  generally  have  a rather 
elaborate  and  explicit  governance  structure.  Holders 
of shares  of stock  have  the  right  to vote  periodically 
on  various  matters  affecting  the  firm.  A  board  of 
directors,  formally  elected  by  the  shareholders,  is 
charged  with  the  responsibility  of  overseeing  the 
operation  of the  firm,  and  has  the  vested  authority 
to  hire  and  dismiss  the  managers  of  the  firm. 
Managers  submit  important  policy  decisions  to  the 
board  at regular  meetings  for formal  approval.  While 
holders  of  various  forms  of  claims  do  have  some 
ability  to monitor  and,  perhaps,  affect  the  actions  of 
managers  via  these  mechanisms,  managers  in  the 
typical  large  corporation  have  wide  discretion  over 
how  they  use  the  firm’s  productive  resources. 
A  more  detailed  description  of  these  complex 
arrangements  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
There  is an extensive  literature  on the  design  of the 
arrangements  between  managers  and  claimholders, 
much  of which  draws  its  inspiration  from  Berle  and 
Means  (1932)  (see,  for  instance  Jensen  and  Meck- 
ling  (1976)  and  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983).  From 
this literature,  one  can  identify  an important  tradeoff 
between  two  opposing  forces:  sharing  risk  widely 
versus  minimizing  conflicts  of  interest. 
The  desire  to allocate risk efficiently leads to widely 
dispersed  ownership  of  the  (risky)  residual  claim 
usually  associated  with  ownership  of the  firm.  The 
dispersion  of  ownership  leads  immediately  to  the 
need  for  delegated  decision  making  authority.  The 
communication  and  coordination  costs  which  would 
be  associated  with  direct  decision  making  by a large 
number  of claimholders  makes  the  appointment  of 
professional  managers  (with  relatively  small  owner- 
ship  stakes)  a  virtual  necessity.  This  is  a  key 
characteristic  distinguishing  the  modern  corporation 
from  the  sole proprietorship  in which  the  owner  and 
manager  are  one  individual. 
The  delegation  of decision-making  authority  is not 
without  its costs.  The  fact that  management’s  owner- 
ship  stake  is relatively  small  suggests  that  the  goals 
and  incentives  of managers  may  not  always  coincide 
perfectly  with  those  of the  claimholders.  In addition, 
managers,  who  are directly  involved  in the  operation 
of the  firm,  are  likely  to  have  a significant  informa- 
tional  advantage  over  claimholders  regarding  alter- 
native  uses  of the  firm’s  resources.  The  delegation 
of decision-making  allows managers  to pursue  private 
objectives  that  might  harm  the  long-term  interests 
of  the  firm. 
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holders  and the  firm’s managers  alluded  to earlier  are 
designed  to mitigate  the  misalignments  of incentives. 
Managerial  compensation  schemes  are often explicitly 
tied  to  the  performance  of  the  firm.  This  strategy 
imposes  part  of  the  residual  risk  associated  with 
managerial  decisions  on  the  managers  themselves. 
This  type  of compensation,  however,  works  against 
the  goal of efficient  risk  sharing  which  originally  led 
to the  dispersion  of ownership  and  the  delegation  of 
decision-making  authority,  since  managers  are made 
to  bear  the  risk  rather  than  claimholders.  Some 
managerial  decisions  can  be  directly  mandated  by 
claimholders  through,  for instance,  covenants  in bond 
and  loan  contracts.  More  specifically,  covenants 
give  the  claimholder  certain  rights-to  declare 
bankruptcy  for  example-in  certain  predetermined 
circumstances.  This.  presumably  discourages  the 
firm’s managers  from  taking  the  undesirable  actions. 
The  manager’s  informational  advantage,  however, 
makes  the  monitoring  of such  agreements  imperfect 
at  best.  And  finally,  the  board  of  directors,  osten- 
sibly  representing  shareholders’  interests,  supervises 
managers  and  attempts  to  ensure  that  managerial 
decisions  are  in  the  interest  of  shareholders.  The 
limitations  of the  supervisory  role of boards  of direc- 
tors are apparent:  because  they  devote  very little time 
to  a  given  firm,  they  are  unable  to  duplicate  the 
managers’  knowledge,  and  so  must  rely  on  limited 
and  self-serving  reports  by  managers  in  evaluating 
managers’  performance.  In  short,  the  nature  of the 
relationship  between  corporate  management  and cor- 
porate  claimholders  leaves  management  with  wide 
discretion  in  allocating  the  firm’s  productive 
resources. 
The  problems  associated  with  the  separation  of 
ownership  and  control  suggest  that  managers  may 
be  able  to  extract  private  benefits,  or “rents,”  from 
their  insider  positions.  There  may  be  actions  that 
managers  can  take  that  benefit  themselves  without 
adding  to the  value  of the  firm and,  therefore,  to the 
wealth  of  the  claimholders.  The  value  of  control, 
then,  is  the  value  of  the  stream  of  benefits  which 
necessarily  accrue  to those  in control  of the firm. This 
is a private  value  in the  sense  that  those  in control 
cannot  credibly  commit  to transfer  these  benefits  to 
claimholders.  These  benefits  may  take  the  form  of 
private  consumption  of “perks”  or  of the  pursuit  of 
private  goals distinct  from value  maximization.  It has 
also been  suggested  by Jensen  (1986)  that  managers 
can derive  private  benefits  from the  discretionary  con- 
trol  over  the  firm’s  free  cash  flow.  For  instance,  in 
order  to  pursue  firm  growth  as  an  end  in  itself,  a 
manager  may  use  retained  earnings  to  fund  invest- 
ments  with  negative  net  present  value.  More  gener- 
ally, access  to internal  funds  for investment  shelters 
managers’  decisions  from  the  scrutiny  they  would 
receive  in  obtaining  external  sources  of finance. 
Allowing management  to extract  private  value may, 
in fact,  be  part  of the  (imperfect)  scheme  for  pro- 
viding  managers  with  correct  incentives.  If managers 
are able to extract  more  rents  during  good  (profitable) 
times  than  bad-because,  for  example,  managers’ 
actions  come  under  more’direct  scrutiny  during  bad 
times-then  managers  have  an  incentive  to  take 
actions  that  make  good  times  more  likely.  In  addi- 
tion,  control  of a large  organization  may  be  valuable 
in and of itself, quite  apart from any resources  directly 
obtained  thereby.  It could  provide  utility  directly  for 
managers  in  the  form  of enhanced  prestige  or  ego 
gratification. 
Corporate  Financial  Claims 
We  can  now  describe  how  the  value  of control  of 
a firm affects  the  nature  of the  financial  claims  issued 
by  the  firm.  It  is  essential  to  our  argument  that  a 
financial  claim  is a contract  between  the  issuer  (the 
corporation)  and  the  holder  of the  claim.  This  con- 
tract  specifies  payments  to be  made  by the  corpora- 
tion  under  a  variety  of  contingencies.  Sometimes 
these  specifications  are explicit,  as in the  case of bank 
loans  or corporate  bonds.  In  other  cases,  promised 
payments  are  implicit,  as in the  expectation  of divi- 
dend  payments  to  equity  holders  based  on  an  an- 
nounced  dividend  policy.  In  addition  to  stipulating 
payments,  the  financial  claim  gives  the  holder  cer- 
tain  rights.  A  debt  holder  may  have  the  right  to 
directly  monitor  some  of the  actions  taken  by  cor- 
porate  management,’  as specified  in a bond  covenant. 
Debt  claims  also  carry  important  rights  in the  case 
of  bankruptcy.  The  main  right  attached  to  a  stan- 
dard  common  stock  equity  claim  is the  right  to vote 
on  some  corporate  governance  matters  on  a  one- 
share-one-vote  basis.  Most  important,  shareholders 
have  the  collective  ability  to  choose  corporate 
management  through  the  election  of  the  board  of 
directors. 
Debt  and  common  stock  equity  are  the  predomi- 
nant  forms  of financial  claims  issued  by the  modern 
corporation.  Other  forms  of  claims  can  be  viewed 
as hybrid  varieties,  such  as preferred  stock  or  con- 
vertible  debt.  Uncovering  the  determinants  of  the 
mix  of claims  issued  by corporations  remains  one  of 
the  major  challenges  of financial  economics.  A  re- 
cent  paper  by  Harris  and  Raviv  (1988)  is  particu- 
larly  relevant  to  the  concerns  of  this  paper.  They 
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control  of a firm and examine  the  implications  of this 
assumption  for  the  design  of  securities.  They  find 
that  if claims  are to be  issued  with  an interest  in pro- 
moting  efficiency-enhancing  changes  in control  but 
deterring  efficiency-reducing  changes,  then  rights 
to vote  on  changes  in control  should  be  attached  to 
equity  claims  and  not  debt  claims.  This  is, of course, 
exactly  the  allocation  of  rights  observed. 
Given  our  arguments  above  that  managers  derive 
private  rents  or  value  from  the  control  of firms,  it 
is useful to view equity  claims as bundled  claims. The 
voting  feature  of tradeable  equity  shares  implies  that 
control  can  be  acquired  through  the  purchase  of 
shares;  buy  enough  shares,  and  you  can  install 
yourself  or anyone  of your  choosing  in top  manage- 
ment  positions.  Hence,  the  claim  to  a  stream  of 
dividends  is bundled  with  a claim  to  the  premium 
that  a potential  manager  might  pay to acquire  enough 
votes  to take  control  of the firm. Note  that this feature 
is  unique  to  equity;  one  cannot  acquire  control  of 
a firm  by  buying  all of its  debt.  Hence,  the  equity 
claim  is necessarily  linked  to  the  process  of change 
in  control,  regardless  of  how  those  changes  come 
about. 
It is interesting  to note  that  firms often  issue voting 
and  nonvoting  classes  of  equity.  While  nonvoting 
equity  is relatively  unimportant  in publicly  held  firms 
in the  U.S.,  in  some  other  countries  it is more  im- 
portant.  The  relative  prices  of voting  and  nonvoting 
shares  often  reflect  the  value of control.  For  instance, 
Hermann  and  Santoni  (1989)  show  that  when  Swiss 
firms  began  allowing  foreign  investors  to hold  voting 
shares,  the  value  of  the  voting  shares  increased 
relative  to the  value  of outstanding  nonvoting  shares 
by as much  as 20 percent.  While  there  may  be other 
explanations  of this  increase,  allowing  foreign  pur- 
chases  of  voting  shares  may  have  increased  the 
likelihood  of  an  acquirer  buying  shares  in  order  to 
obtain  control. 
Takeovers  and  the  Value  of  Control 
When  the  control  of a corporation  changes  hands, 
the  value  of control  is often  transferred  as well.  The 
way  in which  a change  in control  takes  place  deter- 
mines  how  the value of control  is transferred  and how 
the  financial  claims  on  the  corporation  are  affected. 
One  form  of change  in control  is, of course,  internal 
succession  to the  top  management  positions.  When 
a  vacancy  at  the  top  is  filled  by  promotion  from 
within,  the  value  of  control  need  not  be  “pur- 
chased”  from  shareholders.  The  internal  transfer  of 
control  might  represent  an implicit  contract  between 
generations  of  managers;  new  managers  may  have 
“paid for” control  through  a period  of apprenticeship. 
Alternatively,  one  might  view  the  value  of  control 
as accruing  to a coalition  or team  of managers  (such 
as  the  CEO,  the  board  of directors,  and  other  top 
executives).  Internal  succession  then  amounts  to 
keeping  control  in the  hands  of the  same  coalition. 
Similarly,  the  board  of directors  hiring  a CEO  from 
outside  the  firm,  for  instance,  is  a  transaction  be- 
tween  the  controlling  coalition  and  an individual  who 
is joining  the  coalition. 
In  the  cases  of  internal  succession  and  external 
hiring  discussed  above,  there  is  no  change  in  the 
designation  of the  delegated  decision-making  author- 
ity.  There  is,  therefore,  no  need  for  those  engaged 
in the  change  of control  to purchase  control  through 
the  acquisition  of  shares.  However,  sometimes  a 
change  in the  delegation  of control  becomes  desirable 
to  at  least  some  shareholders.  They  may  feel  that 
incumbent  management  has  not  responded  well  to 
a  change  in  the  economic  environment  or  that  an 
alternative  management  would  perform  better.  In 
such  cases;  the  shareholders’  voting  rights  become 
important. 
The  various  ways  in which  a change  in the  dele- 
gation  of  control  might  be  brought  about  were 
discussed  by  Manne  (1965)  in  an  effort  to  outline 
the  economic  role  of  corporate  takeovers.  Manne 
views  all changes  in  control  as  attempts  to  replace 
less  efficient  with  more  efficient  management.  The 
nature  of  the  equity  claim  gives  an  unsatisfied 
shareholder  a number  of  options.  First,  one  could 
try  to  unseat  the  incumbent  board  of  directors 
through  a proxy  contest.  Proxy  contests,  however, 
are  relatively  infrequent.  This  may  be  because  of 
the  costs  involved  in  soliciting  votes;  incumbent 
management  can  use  corporate  resources  to fight  its 
battle,  but  dissidents  must  use  their  own  resources. 
Having  incurred  the  expense,  the  outcome  of  the 
contest  remains  uncertain  until the  actual vote  is held. 
One  way in which  a challenger  for control  can reduce 
the  uncertainty  is through  his or her  own  ownership 
of  shares.  This,  of  course,  suggests  an  alternative 
route  to  obtaining  control.  By  acquiring  enough 
shares,  one  can  dispense  with  the  need  for  a pro-. 
longed  and  potentially  unsuccessful  proxy  contest. 
Faced  with  a  challenge  to  its  (valuable)  control, 
incumbent  management  can  be  expected  to  spend 
resources  resisting  the  change.  This  is  true  in  the 
case  of a proxy  contest  or  an  acquisition  of shares. 
When  a challenger  attempts  to gain  control  through 
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to protect  control  through  the  acquisition  of shares, 
the  share  price  is bid  up  to  reflect  all or  part  of the 
private  value  of  control.  In  a  friendly  merger  as 
opposed  to  a  hostile  takeover,  shareholders  may 
realize  a  smaller  part  of  the  value  of  control;  this 
would  be  so  if the  acquiring  management  obtained 
the  incumbent  management’s  consent  through  some 
form  of  implicit  or  explicit  payment.  In  short,  the 
extent  to which  a change  in control  results  in value 
accruing  to  shareholders  depends  on  the  extent  to 
which  there  is  competition  for  control. 
In  the  absence  of  frictions  or  barriers  to  open 
competition  in  the  market  for  control,  the  market 
price  of equity  would  always  fully  reflect  the  value 
of control.  There  are,  however,  some  important  fric- 
tions  built into the  market  for control.  Many  of these 
derive  from  the  very  nature  of the  relationship  be- 
tween  corporate  ownership  and  management.  An 
unrestricted  market  for  control  could  expose 
managers  to  too  much  employment  risk;  managers 
might  then  have  an  insufficient  incentive  to  ac- 
cumulate  firm-specific  human  capital.  Shareholders 
have  an  interest  in  giving  their,  delegated  decision 
makers  an  incentive  to  make  themselves  well 
matched  to  the  particular  firm  they  are  managing. 
On  the  other  hand,  complete  protection  from  the 
market  for control  is not  good  from  the  shareholders’ 
point  of view.  Entrenched  management  can  receive 
the  private  benefits  of control  with  no  concern  for 
the firm’s performance  on shareholders’  behalf. These 
opposing  forces  suggest  an  optimal  intermediate 
degree  of protection  for incumbent  managers.  Such 
protection  may  take  the  form  of golden  parachutes, 
or  provisions  in  the  corporate  charter  giving  the 
manager  the  right  to  take  certain  defensive  actions 
in  the  event  of  a  takeover  attempt. 
In  addition  to  the  frictions  built  into  the  form  of 
corporate  governance,  government  regulations  can 
create  barriers  to takeover  activity. A variety  of federal 
and  state  regulations  restrict  the  actions  of a raider 
in  a  contest  for  control.  A  prime  example  at  the 
Federal  level  is  the  1968  Williams  Amendment, 
which  restricts  the  actions  of bidding  firms  by,  for 
instance,  requiring  that  tender  offers  be  outstanding 
for a minimum  number  of days.  Such  restrictions  can 
add to the  cost of attempts  to acquire  control,  thereby 
making  such  attempts  less  frequent. 
One  might  label. barriers  to  takeovers  that  arise 
from  legal restrictions  or the  contractual  relationship 
between  ownership  and  management  “artificial” bar- 
riers.  There  may  also be  important  “natural”  barriers 
in the  market  for control.  Both  the  private  value  and 
the  public  profitability  that  a manager  can  achieve 
with  a firm  may  depend  on  how  well-matched  that 
manager  is  to  the  firm’s  organization,  array  of  ac- 
tivities,  and “corporate  culture.”  Time  and  resources 
may  be  required  to  investigate  the  quality  of  such 
a match.  Hence,  the potential  acquirer’s behavior  may 
best  be  viewed  as  a process  of costly  search.  Both 
the  costs  of  search  and  the  likely  costs  of  making 
an  acquisition  (once  a  match  is  found)  affect  the 
raider’s  willingness  to  search  for  targets. 
Viewing the market  for control  as a market  in which 
buyers  or raiders  search  for targets  has  implications 
for the  effects  of the  value  of control  on stock  prices. 
The  extent  to which  a share  price  reflects  the  value 
of control  depends  on  the  probability  that  a poten- 
tial raider  finds  the  firm  to  be  worth  challenging  for 
control.  This  probability,  in  turn,  depends  on  the 
overall  level  of ongoing  search  activity.  In  addition 
to the  artificial and  natural  frictions  suggested  above, 
the  level of search  activity  is likely to depend  on what 
might  be called  the “infrastructure”  of the  market  for 
corporate  control.  By this we mean,  for instance,  the 
conditions  under  which  a raider  could  obtain  financ- 
ing  for  a deal.  Casual  observation  suggests  that  the 
takeover  boom  of  the  1980s  was  fed,  in  part,  by 
innovations  in the market  for below-investment-grade 
corporate  debt  (junk  bonds).  In  short,  the  availa- 
bility  of  a  full  array  of  financial  and  legal  services 
facilitates  the  search  process.  Variation  over  time  in 
these  infrastructure  services  might  contribute  to varia- 
tion  in the  level  of search  and  takeover  activity,  and 
thus  to variations  in stock  price  volatility  over  time. 
We  are  not  aware  of a theoretical  explanation  of 
the  variations  in aggregate  takeover  activity,  although 
it  has  been  suggested  (e.g.,  by  Gort  (1969))  that 
waves  of mergers  are  driven  by  large  disturbances 
to  the  economic  environment.  For  our  purposes,  it 
is enough  to take  as given that  takeover  activity varies 
over  time  according  to a random  process  which  can 
reasonably  be described  by a random  walk.  With  this 
assumption,  in periods  of high .takeover  activity,  such 
activity  is  expected  to  remain  high.  Hence,  the 
perceived  probability  that  a randomly  selected  firm 
faces a challenge  for control  in the  near  future  is high, 
and  the  value  of  a  stock  price  index  significantly 
exceeds  the  expected  value  of the  underlying  stream 
of dividends.  By similar  reasoning,  in periods  of low 
takeover  activity,  stock  prices  are closer  to the  value 
of future  dividends.  These  arguments  lead  directly 
to  our  excess  volatility  results. 
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The  descriptive  analysis  above  can be made  quite 
rigorous.  To  be specific,  one  can  formally  specify  an 
artificial  economy  that  displays  the  forces  described 
above,  albeit  in relatively  stark  and  simple  form.  We 
have  done  this in a forthcoming  paper  (Lacker,  Levy 
and  Weinberg  1990),  where  we  specify  agents’ 
preferences,  their  production  and  investment 
technologies,  and,  most  crucially,  the  informational 
opportunities  available  to them.  The  critical  feature 
of the  economy  is  that  the  agent  that  manages  an 
asset  also has the  ability  to manipulate  the  observed 
return  on  the  asset.  The  appendix  of  this  paper 
describes  a similar  economy  in more  detail.  Here  we 
present  the  main  implications. 
For  our  economy,  we  can  derive  the  equilibrium 
price  of  shares  of  stock  in  any  given  asset.  Let  pt 
now  be  the  price  of a share  ;fno  takeover  occurs  dur- 
ingpmbd  t,  and  let  qt  be  the  price  paid  if there  is 
a takeover  in period  t.  Both  pt and  qt are  determin- 
ed by general  equilibrium  conditions  in our economy: 
pt  by  the  value  investors  place  on  a share  kriowing 
no takeover  will occur  until next  period  at the earliest, 
and  qt  by  the  value  to  a new  manager  of acquiring 
and  subsequently  controlling  the  firm.  In equilibrium 
qt  >  pt,  meaning  that  a new  manager  is willing  to 
pay  a premium  to  acquire  control  of the  firm.  This 
is the value of control  in our economy,  and we denote 
it r)t  =  qt  -  pt.  We  can  find  an  expression  for  the 
equilibrium  value  of pt,  the  current  stock  price,  that 
is  analogous  to  equation  (1).  The  result,  de- 
rived  in the  appendix,  is that  the  current  stock  price 
depends  on  the  expected  value  of  control  in  a 
takeover  as  well  as  on  expected  dividends  and  ex- 
pected  price  as  before: 
(11)  pt  =  (1  +  r)-%[pt+1  +  dt+l 
+  76+1rlt+11. 
The  variable  ?r:  + 1 is the probability  that  a takeover 
occurs  during  period  t + 1, given  information  available 
during  period  t.  Equation  (11)  states  that  the  cur- 
rent  price  of a share  equals  the  expected  discounted 
value  of the  sum of the  price,  dividends  and the value 
of  control,  with  the  latter  weighted  by  the  proba- 
bility  of  a takeover. 
As in the  Martingale  Model,  we  can use  this equa- 
tion to derive  an expression  for the current  stock  price 
in terms  of the  entire  stream  of future  dividends.  As 
before,  the  derivation  requires  repeated  substitution 
for  pt + 1,  pt + 2,  and  so  on.  The  result  is 
(12)  pt  =  VP +  v; 
where  vi’  =  E  (1  +  r)-SEtId+Sr)t+SJ 
s=l 
and v? is defined  as before.  Comparing  equation  (12) 
to  equation  (4)  reveals  that  the  present  value  rela- 
tion  is now  augmented  by a term  related  to the  value 
of control.  The  current  stock  price  is equal  to  the 
expected  present  value of dividends  plus the expected 
present  value  of the  premium  associated  with  con- 
trol,  adjusted  by  the  probability  that  shareholders 
realize  that  premium.  One  immediate  implication  of 
(12)  is that  the  variance  of pt can be written  in terms 
of  the  variances  and  covariance  of  v:’ and  vZ: 
(13)  var(pt)  =  var(v:‘)  +  var(v4)  +  Zcov(v~,v~). 
The  possibility  of excess  volatility  in stock  prices 
is  now  easily  demonstrated: 
Pmposition I:  If  var(vi  )  +  Zcov(v:‘,v~ )  >  0, 
then  var(pt)  >  var(v:‘),  and  the  variance  of the 
stock  price  is greater  than  the  variance  of the 
present  value  of  expected  dividends.  For 
example,  if v? is not  negatively  correlated  with 
v?, then  var(pt)  >  var(v:‘). 
Therefore,  the  price  of a stock  can  vary  by  more 
than  is  justified  by  variations  in  expected  future 
dividends.  The  condition  that  v:’ and  v? are  posi- 
tively  correlated  is  stronger  than  required;  all that 
is needed  is for the  correlation  between  v:‘and  v? to 
be  not  too  large  a negative  number.  This  condition 
seems  reasonable.  if the  actual  real’ixed  value  of cqn- 
trol  is positively  correlated  with  reakd  dividends, 
this  assumption  is  satisfied.  One  would  think  that 
the  expected  value  of  controlling  a  firm  would  be 
larger  if the  firm  is  expected  to  do  better. 
We  have  not  yet  shown  how  the  variance  in stock 
prices  compares  with  the  variance  of dt’ , the  ex post 
rational  price.  The  Martingale  Model  predicts  that 
var(pt)  I  var(d;),  but  this  inequality  is violated  em- 
pirically.  Can  our  economy  display  violations  of this 
inequality?  To  find  out,  first  recall  that  because  d; 
=  v:’  +  x;‘,  and  cov(v~,x~)  =  0  because  of  the 
optimality  of forecasts  of  d;,  we  know  that 
(14)  var(d;)  =  var(vP)  +  var(x:‘). 
The  variance  of  pt  can  be  written  as  follows: 
(15)  var(pt)  =  var(v:‘>  +  var(v?)  +  Zcov(v2,vl) 
=  var(d;)  -  var(xf)  +  var(vY) 
+  2cov(v&v4). 
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variance  bounds  condition  in the  Martingale  Model 
is  violated. 
Pmposition  2  If var(vl)  +  Zcov(v?,vl)  >  var(xP), 
then  var(pt)  >  var(d;),  and  the  variance  of the 
stock  price  is greater  than  the  variance.of  the 
present  value  of  actual  dividends. 
The  condition  in  Proposition  2  states  that  the 
variance  of  the  expected  value  of  control  plus  the 
covariance  of the  expected  value  of control  and  the 
expected  value of dividends  must  exceed  the variance 
of  the  error  in  forecasting  the  present  value  of 
dividends.  This  condition  can be understood  by com- 
paring  var(pt)  in  our  model,  equation  (15),  with 
var(pt)  =  var(d;)  -  var(xf)  from  equation  (9) in the 
Martingale  Model.  In  the  latter,  var(pt)  is equal  to 
var(vtd), which  is  less  than  var(d;)  by  the  amount 
var(x?).  In our  model,  var(pt)  is pester  than  var(v:‘) 
by the  amount  var(vZ)  +  2cov(vt  ,vt”). For  this  effect 
to  dominate,  making  var(pt)  >  var(d;),  var(vZ)  + 
Zcov(v?,vY)  must  be  larger  than  var(x!). 
More  intuitively,  a share  of stock  in our  model  is 
a bundled  claim,  consisting  of the  right  to  a stream 
of dividends  plus  a share  of the  right  to  control  the 
firm.  The  latter  is a value  that  can be  realized  by the 
shareholder  in the  event  of a takeover,  and  it adds 
a variance  to  the  stock  price  above  and  beyond  the 
variance  in  expected  dividends.  It  contributes  a 
variance  of its  own  to  the  price  of the  stock,  and  in 
addition  could  well  be  correlated  with  the  expected 
present  value  of dividends.  These  two  effects  could 
add enough  to the variance  of the  stock  price to make 
it  larger  than  the  variance  in  the  present  value  of 
actual dividends,  consistent  with  the  empirical  vio- 
lations  of  the  Martingale  Model’s  variance  bounds 
condition. 
This  explanation  of  excess  stock  price  volatility 
does  not rely  on  some  other  explanations  that  have 
recently  been  advanced.  Some  economists  have  sug- 
gested  that  fads  or  irrational  “noise  traders”  are 
responsible  for  observed  anamolies  in  stock  prices 
(see  Shiller  (1984),  Black  (1986),  DeLong  et  al., 
(1987),  and  Campbell  and  Kyle  (1988)).  In  our 
economy,  all  agents  are  fully  forward-looking  and 
expectations  are  rational.  There  are  no unexploited 
arbitrage  opportunities  because  the  future  control 
premia  are  rationally  anticipated  and  incorporated 
into  the  current  price  of  the  stock.  There  are  no 
externalities,  and  no  restrictions  on  the  contracts 
agents  can  write  except  those  that  follow  from  the 
technological  and  informational  constraints  agents 
face. In fact, our equilibrium  is Pareto  optimal,  mean- 
ing  that  no  agents  can  be  made  better  off without 
making  some  other  agents  worse  off. The  key feature 
of the  economy  that  gives  rise  to excess  volatility  is 
the  friction  affecting  the  contractual  arrangements 
between  managers  and  claimholders;  managers’ 
privileged  position  in control  of the  asset  implies  a 
positive  value  of  control. 
The  evidence  from  event  studies  of tender  offers 
and  mergers,  described  in  Section  III,  subheading 
“Takeovers  and  Individual  Stock  Prices”  above,  is 
consistent  with  the  model  presented  here.  The  large 
abnormal  increase  in the  stock  price  of the  target  firm 
represents  the  control  premium  qt. The  fact that  the 
stock  price  of  the  bidding  firm  changes  very  little 
suggests  that  a  substantial  part  of  the  increased 
productivity  or private  value of control  associated  with 
the  acquisition  is captured  internally  by  the  acquir- 
ing firm  and  is not  passed  on to  the  acquiring  firm’s 
shareholders. 
Our  model  is also consistent  with  one  of the  most 
striking  features  of  the  empirical  variance  bounds 
literature.  Shiller’s first paper  contained  graphs  plot- 
ting  d;,  the  present  value  of  actual  dividends  (he 
called  it p;),  against  pt,  actual  stock  prices,  for  the 
Standard  and  Poor’s  Composite  Price  Index  and  for 
the  Dow  Jones  Industrial  Average.  The  path  of pi 
is fairly smooth,  while  the  path  of pt takes  large  per- 
sistent  swings  away  from  pi.  An  analogous  graph, 
using  more  sophisticated  techniques  for  removing 
trends,  appears  in a recent  paper  by  Campbell  and 
Shiller  (1987,  Figure  2, p.  1083).  Both  Shiller’s  and 
Campbell  and  Shiller’s plots  show  that  the  difference 
pt  -  pi  was largest  during  four time  periods:  the  first 
decade  of this century,  the late  1920s  the mid-1960s 
and  the  early  1980s.  The  peak  in the  mid-1960s  is 
particulary  large.  All four of these  periods  correspond 
to  merger  waves,  periods  in which  changes  in cor- 
porate  control  were  particularly  frequent.  This  sug- 
gests  that  the  economy  might  experience  periods  in 
which  the  probabilities  of takeover  for a broad  range 
of stocks  move  together  and  exhibit  long  persistent 
swings.  These  swings  might  be  caused  by  accelera- 
tions  of  technological  shifts  as  some  have  argued 
(Gort  1969),  periodic  shifts  in  the  regulatory  en- 
vironment  affecting  changes  in corporate  control,  or 
innovations  in the  infrastructure  of financial  markets. 
V. 
SOMEIMPLICATIONSOFOURTHEORY 
In  this  section  we  briefly  discuss  some  of  the 
implications  of our theory,  first for recent  events  and 
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to  alter  the  regulations  governing  takeovers  and 
markets  for  traded  financial  claims. 
Recent  Developments  in  Financial  Markets 
Dramatic  changes  have  occured  in the  markets  for 
corporate  financial  claims  in the  last  decade.  Stock 
prices  displayed  a broad  upward  trend  through  the 
198Os,  albeit  with  setbacks  in  the  fall of  1987  and 
the  fall of  1989.  It  is a widely  held  perception  that 
volatility  has  increased.  An entirely  new  market  has 
emerged  for below-investment-grade,  tradeable  cor- 
porate  debt,  or “junk bonds.”  And the pace of changes 
in  corporate  control  via  acquisition  of  outstanding 
shares  has  increased  dramatically. 
Simultaneously  explaining  all of these  trends  is far 
beyond  the  scope  of the  present  paper.  However, 
our theory  is able to cast a new light on many  of these 
developments  and  their  interrelations.s  One  plau- 
sible interpretation  is that,  for some  reason,  perhaps 
linked  to  technological  improvements  in the  ability 
of investors  to monitor  firm  performance,  investors 
are  now  much  more  willing  to hold  risky,  high-yield 
corporate  debt  such  as junk  bonds.  While  not  all of 
these  securities  have  been  associated  with  corporate 
takeovers,  it seems  clear  that  they  were  essential  to 
many  of the  control  transactions  of the  1980s.  The 
shift in investor  demand  for these  securities  facilitated 
takeovers  that  would  not  have  been  possible  with- 
out  the  market  for  these  securities.  This  improve- 
ment  in the  ability  of acquirers  to finance  takeovers 
led  in  turn  to  a  secular  rise  in  the  probability  of  a 
takeover  for  a  broad  range  of  stocks,  n: + 1 in  our 
setup,  and  so led to a broad  upswing  in stock  prices. 
The  theory  might  also  illuminate  some  recent 
short-run  swings in stock  prices.  In recently  published 
research,  Mitchell  and Netter  implicate  Congressional 
consideration  of  antitakeover  legislation  in  the 
October  19,  1987  crash  in stock  prices.  They  argue 
that  “a tax bill containing  antitakeover  provisions  pro- 
posed  by  the  U.S.  House  Ways  and  Means  Com- 
mittee  on  October  13,  1987,  and  approved  by  the 
Committee  on  October  1.5 was  the  fundamental 
economic  event  causing  the greater  than  10%  decline 
in  the  stock  market  on  October  14-16,  which 
arguably  triggered  the  October  19  crash.”  By 
making  takeovers  more  costly,  such  a  bill  would 
reduce  the  probability  of future  takeovers  and  thus 
depress  current  stock  prices,  consistent  with  our 
theory. 
5 There  may  be  plausible  alternative  explanations,  of  course. 
Analogously,  the  role  of the  junk  bond  market  in 
facilitating  changes  in corporate  control  might  explain 
why  information  about  the  willingness  of investors 
to  hold  below-investment-grade  securities  would 
affect  stock  prices  so strongly,  as they  seemed  to in 
1989.  At  many  times  during  that  year,  particularly 
during  the  late summer  and early fall, reports  of broad 
stock  price  declines  cited  sharp  declines  in junk  bond 
prices  as the  proximate  cause.  Similarly,  the  collapse 
of  one  well-publicized  deal,  the  bid  for  UAL,  was 
cited  often  for  the  broad  decline  in  stock  prices  in 
the  fall.  Finally,  we  note  that  the  fall  of  broad 
measures  of  stock  prices  since  Summer  1989  has 
coincided  with  a  rise  in  the  use  of  proxy  fights  in 
corporate  control  contests,  a  method  of  control 
change  that  does  not  provide  shareholders  with  an 
immediate  monetary  payment. 
Regulations  to  Curb  Takeovers  and  Reduce 
Stock  Price  Volatility 
The  finding  of  excess  volatility  of  stock  prices 
is often  taken  as evidence  of capital  market  imper- 
fections  or the  presence  of irrationality  in the  deter- 
mination  of  asset  prices  (see  Shiller  (1984),  Black 
(1986),  DeLong  et  al.,  (1987),  and  Campbell  and 
Kyle  (1988)).  Such  imperfections,  in turn,  are  often 
adduced  in support  of various  policy  proposals  that 
would  legislatively  alter  the  way  financial  markets 
currently  operate.  For  example,  some  advocate  that 
“circuit breakers”  or “collars” be imposed  on the  stock 
market  to  halt  or  restrict  trading  in  the  event  that 
prices  change  by  more  than  some  prespecified 
amount  (see,  for  example,  Greenwald  and  Stein 
(1988)).  The  argument  is  that  such  restrictions 
would  reduce  price  volatility  and  improve  the  effi- 
ciency  of financial markets.  Similarly,  some  have  sug- 
gested  policy  changes  to discourage  takeovers,  either 
by  making  the  financing  of takeovers  more  difficult 
or costly,  or by  erecting  barriers  to  changes  in con- 
trol  via  acquisition  of  shares  (Scherer  (1988),  for 
example). 
A  complete  evaluation  of  these  many  proposals 
is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  We  can  point 
out,  however,  that  in our  model  takeovers  regularly 
occur,  and  are  responsible  for  excess  stock  price 
volatility.  Excess  volatility  arises  because  of  the 
mechanisms  by which  the  complex  agency  problems 
inherent  in  the  management  and  financing  of  the 
modern  corporation  are resolved.  These  mechanisms 
thus  have  a positive  allocation  role.  In  fact,  excess 
volatility  is consistent  with  full market  efficiency  in 
our  model,  and  there  is  no  constructive  role  for 
government  intervention.  The  lesson,  then,  is that 
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than  can  be explained  by the  Martingale  Model  does 
not  by  itself justify  regulatory  intervention  in finan- 
cial  markets. 
Of  course,  a wide  range  of  government  policies 
already  in  place  have  important  effects  on  the 
phenomena  our  model  attempts  to  describe.  The 
requirements  imposed  on corporate  charters  constrain 
the  legal forms  that  corporate  governance  can  take. 
The  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  signifi- 
cantly  constrains  the  financial  structure  and  conduct 
of publicly  held  firms,  requiring,  for  example,  that 
votes  be  strictly  proportional  to shareholdings.  SEC 
regulations  also impose  severe  restrictions  on tender 
offers.  Underlying  all  financial  claims,  of  course, 
the  structure  of  bankruptcy  law  has  an  important 
and  sometimes  neglected  influence  on  financial 
arrangements. 
Our  model  is not  rich  enough,  as yet,  to  be  able 
to fully assess  the  role  of these  and  other  regulations 
affecting the  market  for control.  We  suspect  that  they 
have  important  effects  on the  way various  legal rights 
are  allocated  among  the  claimants  of  a  firm,  and 
thereby  have  important  effects  on the  market  for cor- 
porate  control.  Altering  these  regulations  may  well 
reduce  stock  price  volatility,  but  would  most  likely 
alter  the  efficiency  with  which  the  control  of assets 
is allocated.  Any  assessment  of the  impact  of alter- 
ing such  regulations  must  look  far beyond  the  effect 
on  stock  price  volatility. 
VI. 
CONCLUDINGREMARKS 
Our  analysis  contains  a broader  message  for  the 
understanding  of financial  markets.  Traditional  ap- 
proaches  to  asset  pricing  treat  an  asset  as  nothing 
more  than  a  claim  to  a  stream  of  payments.  The 
starting  point  of our  analysis  is the  view  that  a finan- 
cial  asset  is  a  contractual  relation  between  various 
parties.  A direct  implication  of this view,  as our model 
illustrates,  is  that  financial  assets  in  general,  and 
traded  stock  shares  in particular,  are bundled  claims 
tying  together  fragments  of governance  rights  with 
titles to streams  of payments.  Building upon  this view 
may  provide  us  with  new  insights  into  the  diverse 
financial  arrangements  characteristic  of  developed 
economies. 
In this  appendix,  we  develop  a simple  model  that 
delivers  an equilibrium  pricing  equation  of the  form 
of equation  (11).  The  model  is similar in spirit  to the 
one  in  Lacker,  Levy  and  Weinbeig  (1990).  That 
paper  was concerned  with  demonstrating  that  excess 
volatility  was  possible  in  principle.  The  model 
described  here  is somewhat  more  general  in that  it 
allows  for  periodic  swings  in  takeover  activity  and 
shows  how  these  might  lead  to coincident  swings  in 
stock  prices. 
In this  economy  there  is a large number  of durable 
productive  assets  (projects)  and  an  even  larger 
number  of  people  (agents).  Some  people  are 
claimholders,  and others  are managers.  Together  with 
the  services  of a manager,  a project  can  produce  a 
stream  of  putput  {zt},  t = 1,2,  .  .  .  ,  where 
zt  =  dt  +  y’*.  The  portion  dt of the  project’s  output 
is publicly  observed.  A manager  can commit  to pay- 
ing  out  (all  or  a  part  of)  dt  to  claimholders.  The 
remainder  of  the  project’s  output,  y;,  is  privately 
observed  by the  maqager  and is not  verifiable  by any 
outsider.  Hence,  yt  is  simply  consumed  by  the 
person  who  controls  the  firm,  and  cannot  be  con- 
tractually  transferred  to claimholders.  These  are the 
rents  that  accrue  to managers  and  correspond  to the 
private  value  of control  posited  by Harris  and  Raviv 
(1989). 
The  per  period  value  of control,  yi, and dividends, 
dt, are assumed  to follow stochastic  processes  given 
by 
(A. 1)  yt  =  aoy’t  - 1  +  ei,  and 
dt  =  aldt-  1  +  I.& 
where  ao,  al  I  1,  and  ei  and  ui  are  independent, 
mean-zero  random  variables,  independently  and iden- 
tically  distributed  over  time.6 
6 One  could  assume  a  more  general  joint  process  for  (y’,d,} 
without  altering  the  results.  Under  more  general  assumptions, 
claimholders  would  need  to be  able  to form  expectations  about 
future  values  of  unobservables,  y,  based  only  on  publicly  ob- 
served  variables.  Our  assumptions  allow  us  to  avoid  the  filter- 
ing  problem  which  arise  with  a more  general  specification. 
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{dr},  and  these  claims  are  attached  to  voting  rights 
allowing  claimholders,  collectively,  to delegate  con- 
trol  of  the  productive  project.  For  simplicity,  we 
assume  that  a change  in control  requires  a unanimous 
vote.  Hence,  a raider  can acquire  control  by purchas- 
ing  all  claims  to  a  particular  project.  We  assume, 
however,  that  there  are  agents  engaged  in  search 
activity  to obtain  information  about  the  value  of con- 
trolling  projects.  We  do  not  model  this  search 
behavior  explicitly.  Rather,  we  simply  assume  that 
at  any  point  in  time  there  is  a probability  &,  that 
a  raider  arrives  on  the  scene  and  obtains  informa- 
tion  about  the  value  of control.  We  assume  that  r#~t 
follows  a first-order  stationary  markov  process,  that 
is, that  the  probability  distribution  of & + 1, given  the 
entire  history  of  realizations  up  to  and  including 
period  t (4t - j for j = 0, 1  ,2,. ..),  depends  only  on +r. 
The  raider  observes  the  incumbent’s  current  value, 
y:,  and  also  learns  what  his  own  value  would  be  if 
he took  control;  call this Y;. We  assume  that  if a raider 
arrives  in period  t,  then  y]  =  yi - r  +  e],  where  e] 
satisfies the  same  assumptions  as does  &, but is drawn 
independently  of ei. Thus  the  raider’s  current-period 
value  of control  could  be  different  from  the  incum- 
bent  manager’s  current-period  value  of  control. 
The  value of control  is the present  discounted  value 
of  the  stream  of  per  period  values  of  control, 
weighted,  for each  future  period,  by  the  probability 
that  the manager  will still be incumbent  in that period. 
The  value  of control  is calculated  by the  incumbent 
manager,  yielding  the  amount  the  incumbent 
manager  would  accept  to  forego  continued  control 
of the  asset.  The  value  of control  is also  calculated 
by  the  raider;  it is the  amount  the  raider  would  pay 
to  acquire  control  of the  asset.  Both  quantities  are 
influenced  by  the  past  exqerience  of  the  project 
through  the  influence  of  y; - I,  and  for  both  the 
incumbent  manager  and  the  raider  the  future  of the 
value  of  control  evolves  according  to  (A.l).  But 
because  y] can  differ  from  yi,  and  because  these  in- 
fluence  the  expected  values  of y: + S and  yt + s, there 
can  be  a discrepancy  between  the  value  of control 
to  the  incumbent  and  the  value  of  control  to  the 
raider. 
Once  y] and Y; are observed,  the  raider  can choose 
to  initiate  a bid  for  control  through  the  acquisition 
of shares.  We  assume  that  there  is an arbitrarily  small 
but  nonzero  cost  of initiating  a challenge  for control. 
Hence,  the  raider  only  does  so  if  his  own  value  of 
control  is greater  than  the  incumbent’s.7  Define  Qt 
as  the  probability  that  a  raider  appears  in  period  t 
and has  a greater  value  of  control  than  the  incum- 
bent.  The  value  of  @t depends  on  the  raider’s  ex- 
pectations  of future  per  period  values  of the  control, 
yi + s, and  the  probability  that  some  other  raider  will 
come  along  and  acquire  the  asset  in the  future.  We 
take  the  series  9t  as given  for  now.  Let  q” be  the 
value  of losing  control:  the  expected  present  value 
of the  manager’s  earnings  from  the  next-best  alter- 
native  occupation  in  the  event  of  losing  control  of 
the  asset.  Then  the  value  of control  of an  asset  can 
be  written  as 
(A.2)  vf  =  (1  +  r) - ‘Et{&+  17’ 
+  Cl-@t+d(yf+1  +  rlf+1)}. 
ri + r is the  value  of being  in control  at the  end  of 
period  t + 1. Equation  (A.2)  states  that  the  value  of 
control  is the  present  value  of the  value  of losing con- 
trol,  multiplied  by  the  probability  of losing  control 
next  period,  plus  the  value  of  remaning  in  control 
at  the  end  of next  period,  multiplied  by  the  proba- 
bility  of remaining  in  control.  An  identical  expres- 
sion  determines  the  value  of control  for a raider,  $. 
Note  that  if a raider  assumes  control  this  period,  at 
the  end  of the  next  period  he  is  an  incumbent,  so 
ri + r appears  on the right side of the expression  for T$Z 
(A.3)  $  =  (1 +r)  - ‘Et(at  + 17’ 
+  (I-@t+d(yf+1  +  rlf+1)}. 
If a raider  arrives  in period  t,  a change  of control 
takes  place  only  if q;  >  &  the  value  of control  to 
the  raider  exceeds  the  value  of control  to the  incum- 
bent.  Because  yi + s evolves  according  to a stationary 
process,  one  can  show  that  T,I~  >  7;  if and  only  if 
e5 >  e:,  the  current-period  value  of control  is larger 
for the  raider  than  for the  incumbent.  Therefore,  the 
probability  that  a change  in control  occurs  ifa  raider 
arrives  in period  t is Pr[e]  >  e:]. The  probability  that 
a change  in control  actually  occurs  in period  t is then 
&  =  &Pr[e]  >  e]],  the  probability  that  a  raider 
arrives  times  the  probability  that  a  change  occurs 
given  that  a raider  has  arrived.  Given  our  assump- 
tions  about  tit,  e:,  and  ei,  the  expected  future  rate 
of  change  in  control  depends  only  on  the  current 
value  of  Qt. 
7 Relaxing this  assumption,  so that  there  is a dontest  for control 
whenever  a raider  “arrives,”  would  not  change  the  nature  of the 
results  but  would  complicate  the  computation  of  the  present 
discounted  value  of  control. 
42  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MARCH/APRIL  1990 We  define  ?T:+~ to  be  the  probability,  given  that 
the  firm  does  not  face  a challenge  to  control  before 
or during  period  t,  of the  first  such  challenge  occur- 
ring  in  period  t+s.  For  s  =  1,  a:+,  =  Qt+r.  For 
s  1  2,  n:+,  is  given  by 
n:+s  =  +‘t+s 
s-l 
j41  (I-@t+j). 
Equation  (A.2)  can  now  be  solved  forward  to yield 
T$ =  Et  c”  (1 +r)-s[7r:+sqo 
s=l 
+  (n: + s(1 -at  + s)/@t + s>Yi + s 
I 
Notice  that  7: depends  on the  expected  future  rate 
of takeover  .activity,  as well as on the expected  future 
values  of y:. 
If a raider  arrives  in period  t and  draws  a current 
value  of  control,  e:,  that  is  larger  than  the  incum- 
bent’s,  then  the  raider  outbids  the  incumbent  by pay- 
ing a premium  of $  for the  equity  shares  of the  firm. 
In  the  event  of  a takeover, 
dividend)  of  the  shares  is 
(A.4)  qt  =  vt’  +  7:. 
In  the  event  that  there  is 
period  t,  the  (ex  dividend) 
pt  =  (l+r)-‘EtIdt+r  + 
+  (1 -d+1)pt+11. 
-  . 
the  purchase  price  (ex 
no  takeover  attempt  in 
stock  price  is 
a:+1qt+1 
Using  equation  (A.4)  and solving  forward,  we have 
pt  =  v:’  +  v:, 
where 





For  convenience,  $+s  is  written.  as  ~t+~  in 
Section  IV,  subheading  “Takeovers  and  Stock 
Prices.” 
Suppose  that  there  are a large  number  of identical 
versions  of the  asset  that  we have just  described.  The 
stochastic  processes  governing  dt,  ei,  e:,  and  9t  are 
the  same,  although  the  realizations  of these  random 
processes  are  independent  across  assets.  If’ the 
number  of these  assets  is quite  large,  then  the  frac- 
tion  that  experience  a change  in control  is very  close 
to  the  population  probability  that  a change  in  con- 
trol  occurs  (by  the  Law  of  Large  Numbers).  Now 
define  ri  + s as the  probability  that  a takeover  occurs 
in period  t +s  to  any given  firm  selected  at random, 
given  the  information  known  in  period  t.  Imagine 
calculating  a stock  price  index  as a weighted  average 
of  individual  stock  prices;  the  weights  are  not 
important-any  arbitrary  weights  will do.  Then  the 
formula  derived  above  will  also  apply  to  the  stock 
index,  where  pt  is  the  value  of  the  stock  price 
index,  and  qf, VT,  and  v? are  interpreted  as weighted 
averages  across  stocks. 
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